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RUNNING HEAD: TRACES OF OWNED OBJECTS 
Abstract 
 
An object's mental representation i cludes not just visible attributes but also its non-visible 
history. The present studies tested whether preschoolers se k subtle indicators of an object's 
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age and 97 college students found that children (like adults) earched for concealed traces of 
object history, invisible traces of object history, and the absence of traces of object history, to 
successfully identify an owned object.  Controls demonstrated that children (like adults) 
appropriately limit their search for hidden indicators when an owned object is visibly distinct. 
Altogether, these results demonstrate that concealed and invisible indicators of history are an 
important component of preschool children's object concepts. 
Children seek historical traces of owned objects 
 For adults, the mental representation of an object includes not just visible attri utes, such 
as shape, color, or size, but also non-visible attributes, such as function, internal parts, and causal 
links among features (Keil, 2006; Meyer, Leslie, Gelman, & Stilwell, 2013; Rips, 2011).  Among 
the non-visible attributes that enter into adults' object representations, one of the most pervasive 
is an object's history, such as who owned it and where it has been. Historical considerations play 
an important role in how e value and interact with objects.  For example, works of art with 
authentic history are highly valued, collected, and exhibited in museums, whereas forgeries or 
mass-produced copies of the same works are not (Newman & Bloom, 2012).  The role of history 
extends beyond artwork to a wide range of items with both famous and personal connections 
(Frazier, Gelman, Wilson, & Hood, 2009; Newman & Bloom, 2014; Newman, Diesendruck, & 
Bloom, 2011), such as items owned by a celebrity or a beloved family member, as well as items 
with distinctive origins (e.g., moon rocks) or participation in a meaningful event (e.g., dishes 
from Pompeii).  Moreover, objects with a negative history (such as a sweater handled by an evil 
person) are viewed as contaminated and to be avoided, even if the negative history leaves no 
visible trace (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994). 
 Young children, too, are sensitive to object history. At the most basic level, children 3-5 
years of age use the historical path of an object (that is, its spatiotemporal continuity) to 
determine its identity (Gutheil, Gelman, Klein, Michos, & Kelaita, 2008; Hall, 1996; Sorrentino, 
2001), and consider past states to determine plausible future states (Friedman, 2003; Rosengren, 
Gelman, Kalish, & McCormick, 1991). Also like adults, preschool children tr at objects with 
special history (e.g., celebrity possessions) as having higher value and being worthy of display in 
museums (Frazier & Gelman, 2009; Gelman, Frazier, Noles, Manczak, & Stilwell, 2015), and 
objects with negative history (e.g., contamination) as items to be avoided (Hejmadi, Rozin, & 
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 Object history is central to concepts of wnership.  By 5 years of age, children view 
historical information (e.g., agirl brought a ball to the beach) but not information about the 
future (e.g., a boy will leave the beach with the ball) as diagnostic of ownership (Friedman, Van 
de Vondervoort, Defeyter, & Neary, 2013). Young children prefer their own original attachment 
objects (e.g., special blanket or soft toy) to exact replicas, which are perceptually identical but 
lack the significant history (Hood & Bloom, 2008).  By 3 years of age, children keep close track 
of objects designated as belonging to them, thus tracing a continuous historical path through 
space and time (Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012).  Children trace the historical path of owned 
objects even when such objects are undesirable ( .g., a plain piece of wood) or non-distinctive 
(e.g., one of three identical toys).  Ownership information has special status, as children pay 
greater attention to the individual identity of objects that are tagged with ownership information 
("This is yours") than objects that are tagged with other sorts of information, such as a count-
noun label ("This is a sarn") (Gelman, Noles, & Stilwell, 2014).   
 Even for ordinary objects without a specified owner, object history plays a powerful role.  
Three- and four-year-old children use object features to make accurate inferences about their 
history--for example, that an apple that is wet had previously been splashed with water (Gelman, 
Bullock, & Meck, 1980).  In somewhat the r verse process, 22-month-olds (but not 19-month-
olds) can use verbally provided historical information to update their representation of a non-
visible object ("I spilled water all over Lucy [a toy frog]. Lucy is wet now! She's covered with 
water."; Ganea, Shutts, Spelke, & DeLoache, 2007). Thus, when historical cues are overt, 
children add them to their representation of an object, yielding an updated representation that 
retains the object history.  When the object choices are then visible, and one of the choices 
visibly includes the relevant feature (i.e., wetness), they identify that item as their own. 
 The current studies examine a related but distinct u derstanding: that history leaves traces, 
and that these traces are relevant to ownership judgments. We ask not just whether children 
retain historical features, but also whether they seek information about object history to 
differentiate two seemingly identical objects (akin to when an adult might use scuff marks or 
fingerprints to identify a certain item).  We studied children's performance both when the 
historical cue is hidden yet retrievable (Studies 1, 2, and 5) and when the historical cue is wholly 
invisible (Studies 3, 4, and 5). Is object history sufficiently central to ownership concepts that 
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ownership judgments? By studying children's sensitivity to object history, we can learn more 
about how and when children's object concepts extend beyond associations among perceptible 
features to include theory-like considerations. 
 The basic task and logic are as follows.  On each of a series of trials, the researcher 
assigns one of two seemingly identical objects to the child.  The researcher then marks one of the 
objects in a hidden location (e.g., on the bottom of the object), either showing the child the mark 
(Studies 1, 2, and 5) or not (Studies 3, 4, and 5). Objects are then placed on a spinner (with a lid) 
and spun to defeat spatiotemporal tracking of either object.  After the spinner comes to a halt, the 
lid is lifted and the researcher asks simply:  “Can you find which one is yours?”  In order for 
children to succeed on this task, they need to seeka cue that is non-obvious, hidden from view, 
and not explicitly referenced.  Recent research shows that young children represent non-obvious 
features of objects when reasoning about function (Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, & Blair, 
2000; Ware & Booth, 2010), causes (Walker, Lombrozo, Legare, & Gopnik, 2014), and internal 
parts (Setoh, Wu, Baillargeon, & Gelman, 2013; Sobel, Yoachim, Gopnik, Meltzoff, & 
Blumenthal, 2007).  Moreover, ownership has been proposed to be a developmental primitive 
(Jackendoff, 1992), and the capacity to link visible features to historical processes has also been 
proposed to be an i tuitive cognitive process (Leyton, 1992).  We therefore predicted that 
preschool children would treat object history as central to determinations of ownership, and--
without prompting--would look for the concealed “trace” of the object’s history by examining 
the hidden location and select the item that had been designated as their own.  
 In contrast, recent findings on preschoolers' object concepts would also support three 
alternative predictions.  First, children might ignore the historical traces in favor of more salient 
object features (e.g., object shape, size, color, texture, and/or function).  The historical features in 
the present studies were inconspicuous and without functional consequences, and a large body of 
research demonstrates the salience of shape and function in children's judgments at this age 
(Kemler Nelson et al., 2000; Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1988). Furthermore, DeJesus, Shutts, and 
Kinzler (2015) found that it was not until 5.82 years of age that children made use of historical 
cues in a food-selection task.  Below that age, children were insensitive to contamination cues 
(i.e., an experimenter sneezing into one of two bowls of food), and showed no preference for the 
clean vs. contaminated food source.  Thus, attending to traces of object history may not emerge 
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 A second alternative possibility is that children might attend preferentially to 
spatiotemporal cues marking ownership.  Spatiotemporal cues are argued to be the primary basis 
of identity judgments by the time children are 4-5 years of age (Gutheil et al., 2008), and by 
three years of age children skillfully use patial proximity or spatiotemporal continuity in their 
ownership judgments (Friedman & Neary, 2008; Friedman et al., 2013; Gelman et al., 2012; 
Gelman et al., 2014). Thus, when spatiotemporal continuity is disrupted (i.e., when the items in 
this task are covered up and spun), children may either make use of an item's proximity 
(selecting the item closest to them), or having insufficient information, randomly guess. 
 A third alternative possibility is that children could reason that incidental marks are 
irrelevant to ownership, so that items that differ in slight ways are equivalent. This would be 
consistent with economic models of how money is treated in fina cial transactions (see Zelizer, 
1997, for review).  When playing poker, for example, money or chips are put into a common pot, 
and then redistributed over the course of the game. It doesn't matter whether one receives the 
same exact coins or tokens that one initially put into the pot, as long as one receives the right 
amount in the end.  Prior evidence would suggest that owned objects are not wholly fungible for 
children because, as noted earlier, when given an opportunity to use spatiotemporal continuity to 
track which objects belong to themselves, young children distinguish their own object from an 
identical unowned object (Gelman et al., 2014).  Nonetheless, spatiotemporal continuity may be 
a uniquely powerful cue for children, and in its absence, children may be aware of minor featural 
differences between objects in a set but choose not to seek them out.   
 We focused on children 3-5 years of age, given that 4- and 5-year-olds have been the 
focus of prior research arguing for the primacy of children's use of spatiotemporal history over 
featural cues (Gutheil et al., 2008; Hood & Bloom, 2008), as well as research documenting 
developmental changes taking place between 3 and 5 years of age in children's 
appearance/reality contrasts (Deák, Ray, & Brenneman, 2003; Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983), 
use of subtle features indicating function (Kelemen, Widdowson, Posner, Brown, & Casler, 
2003), and the kinds of features used on certain categorization and induction tasks (Badger & 
Shapiro, 2012; Fisher, 2011).  Adults were included as a basis of comparison, and provided a 
developmental endpoint.  Studies 1-4 focused on four- and five-year-olds, and Study 5 extended 
these methods to three-y ar-old children. 
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 In Study 1, we provided participants with ownership information, varied whether or not 
the owned object had a distinctive and marked history, and then tested whether participants 
sought information regarding the object's history before making an ownership judgment.  We 
predicted that even young children would spontaneously search for traces of the owned object's 
history prior to making ownership judgments, and that they would successfully use this 
information to determine ownership. A no-history control was included, which was identical to 
the experimental condition except that no indications of differential histories were made or 
implied.  This tests the baseline rates at which participants examine objects on this task.  We 
predicted that participants would inspect the objects l s  in the absence of special history. 
Method 
 Participants.  Participants included 34 children (age range 4.08-5.43; M age 4.74; 15 girls, 
19 boys) and 32 adults (age range 17-21; 15 women, 17 men), randomly assigned in equal
numbers to either the experimental condition or the no-history control condition. One additional 
child (age 4.87) was dropped for failure to understand the task. Children were recruited from 
communities in and around a Midwestern American university town; 88% were White. The adult 
participants consisted of undergraduates at a large university in the same town; 67% were White.  
Across the five studies, testing took place from December, 2009 to January, 2015. 
 Items.  Six pairs of identical objects were used in this study (see Table 1). These items 
were small, ordinary objects and included: miniature notebooks, wooden disks, containers of 
Play-Doh, wooden stars, cardboard gift boxes, and oval boxes each containing a tiny alien 
figurine. Several tools were used to alter the objects in some way; these included a pencil, sticky 
note, small scrap of paper, and paintbrush. The warm-up task used two differently colored but 
otherwise identical Legos, and two identical paper cups. Additional materials included a spinner 
with an opaque plastic cover and a small fabric basket.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 Procedure.  Participants were tested individually in a child-friendly, on-campus lab.  
Each participant sat at a small table, at a90-degree angle from the researcher, with the spinner 
and fabric basket in front of them. Participants were first told that they would hear ownership 
information about a set of objects; furthermore, they were notified that they could pick up or 
otherwise manipulate the objects in order to help them answer the test questions. 
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they were first given a warm-up trial, in which the object pair consisted of two Legos differing in 
color. One Lego was assigned to the participant (“This is yours. This is for [participant’s 
name].”) but otherwise was not marked by the researcher in any way.  The other object was no
assigned to anyone, but attention was drawn to it (“See this? Look at this.”).  Then, the Legos 
were covered with small paper cups, such that they were obscured from view. The objects were 
then placed on the spinner, covered, and spun. The research uncovered the spinner and asked, 
“Can you find which one is yours?” Participants were required to successfully complete the 
warm-up (i.e., remove the paper cup(s) to find the correct Lego) before advancing to the test 
trials.  Only one child (age 4.08) chose the distracter Lego; for this child, the warm-up was 
repeated until they selected the correct object.  
 On test trials, participants saw one item at a time. When showing the first object in each 
pair, the researcher said, “This is yours. This is for [participant’s name].” In the experimental 
condition, the researcher then proceeded to mark the participant's object in a hidden place, either 
inside or on the underside of the object.  The notebook, disk, and gift box had already been 
marked, in order to feasibly re-use the same objects with different participants, so for these 
objects the experimenter simply pretended to make the mark during the course of the experiment. 
The experimenter explicitly mentioned making the mark (e.g., “Let’s mark this with a pencil”) 
and showed the mark to the participant after it had been made. After the manipulation, the object 
was placed on the table in such a way that the distinguishing feature was no longer visible. The 
no-history control condition was identical, except that no indications of differential histories 
were made or implied.  That is, the researcher did not mark or pretend to mark either object. 
 In both conditions, the researcher then showed the participant the second item of the pair. 
Participants received no information about the ownership of this second item; instead, it was 
introduced with, “See this? Look at this.”  Thus, attention was drawn to both objects in the pair. 
 The objects were then placed on the spinner, covered, and spun. For the majority of adult 
participants, the first object was placed under the lid before the second object was presented, in 
order to thwart a side-by-side visual comparison of the objects that could have allowed the 
detection of minute perceptible differences.  (The first few adult participants did see the objects 
side-by-side, as did a few further participants for whom the researcher forgot to place the first 
object under the lid before presenting the second object.  However, responses were comparable 
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asked to close their eyes before the objects were placed and spun, to prevent them from tracking 
the objects’ locations during spinning (based on pilot-tes ing in which some adults attempted to 
use this strategy). Children did not demonstrate a tendency to track the spinner’ position; thus 
they were not asked to close their eyes and were instead invited to help the experimenter spin the 
spinner.  
 After the spinner had completed spinning, the experimenter uncovered the objects and 
asked the participants, “Can you find which one is yours?” Once the participant had selected an 
object, they were instructed to place it inside the fabric basket (this allowed experimenters to 
later determine which object the child had chosen).  After the first set of items, the researcher 
moved on to the next set.  The six item sets were presented in one of two random orders. Test 
trials were not repeated for any reason. 
 At the end of the testing session, adult participants received debriefing that explained the 
purpose of the study, and children were thanked for their participation and received a small gift. 
Coding 
 Choice scoring.  After the testing session had ended, participants’ object choices were 
determined by examining the objects placed into the fabric basket. For each of the six test trials, 
the object choice was scored as 1 if the participant selected the marked, “yours”-designated 
object and as 0 if the participant selected the distracter object. Thus, participants could obtain a 
maximum choice accuracy score of 6 and a minimum score of 0. Object choice from the warm-
up trial was not included in the overall accuracy score. 
 Coding for checks.  Each videotaped session was coded for participants’ checking 
behaviors. A check was coded ach time a participant picked up an object and looked in the 
location where the mark had been made on the target object (regardless of whether that particular 
object had actually been marked). If a participant examined both objects in a pair simultaneously, 
this was coded as two checks. A check was not coded if the participant picked up or otherwise 
examined the object without looking specifically in the location of the mark.  All checks on a 
given trial were summed per participant.  A second coder also viewed ach video recording; 
when disagreements in coding occurred (which was rare), they were resolved by discussion.  
Results 
 Choices. As noted above, each participant received a score (0-6) for the number of trials 
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experimenter error) were excluded, and scores adjusted (e.g., a child who received only 5 trials 
had their responses summed and multiplied by 6/5). These scores were entered into a 2-way 
ANOVA with age group (child, adult) and condition (experimental, no-history c ntrol) as 
between-subjects factors (see Table 2). There was a main effect of condition, F(1,62) = 44.71, p 
< .001, ηp² = .42, indicating substantially greater accuracy in the experimental condition than the 
no-history control condition (Ms = 5.55, 3.34).  There was also a main effect of age group, 
F(1,62) = 6.65, p = .012, ηp
Insert Table 2 about here 
² = .10, indicating that adults overall were more accurate than 
children (Ms = 4.87, 4.02), but no significant interaction.  One-way t-tests against the chance 
value of 3.0 indicate that participants successfully identified the owned object in the 
experimental condition, t(32) = 10.93, p < .001, but not in the no-history control condition, t(32) 
= 1.30, p = .20. 
 Checks. The total number of checks per participant were entered into a 2-way ANOVA 
with age group (child, adult) and condition (experimental, no-history control) as between-
subjects factors (see Table 3).  There was a main effect of condition, F(1,62) = 40.64, p < .001, 
ηp² =.40, a main effect of age group, F(1,62) = 58.95, p < .001, ηp² = .49, and a condition x age 
group interaction, F(1,62) = 40.64, p < .001, ηp
Insert Table 3 about here 
² = .40.  The interaction revealed that children 
were much more likely to search for traces in the experimental condition than the no-history 
control condition (Ms = 8.39, 1.18), p < .001, whereas adults searched in both conditions equally 
(Ms = 9.13, 9.13), n.s. 
Discussion 
 Study 1 demonstrates that preschoolers, like adults, spontaneously seek and make use of 
cues to object history, when tasked with identifying which of two outwardly identical objects is 
their own.  These cues were hidden inside or underneath the target object, and thus not visible 
upon outward inspection of the objects--during either initial presentation or test.  Additionally, 
the cues to history were subtle (e.g., a thumbprint; a dot of paint), retained over a delay (during 
which the objects are hidden under the spinner top, spun, and uncovered), requiring active searh 
(turning an object over or opening it up), and not directly queried (prompted by a query about 
ownership: "Which is yours?", not a query about history, e.g., "Which did I mark?" or "Which 
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distinguish their own object from one that was not their own, but they also searched for such 
marks in the absence of any prompting on the part of the experimenter.  These results extend 
beyond prior work, which was focused on children's use of visible, overt cues to object history 
(such as proximity to the owner).  We do not claim that children attended to history instead of 
perceptual cues, but rather that children's object representations and ownership judgments 
meaningfully included the perceptual cues that result from
 As expected, children were much less likely to search the objects in the no-history control 
condition (when the objects had been provided with no distinctive history).  Surprisingly, 
however, adults checked the objects just as often in the control condition as in the experimental 
condition.  Perhaps the possibility of differential histories was so salient to adults that they 
searched for historical cues even when not prompted by the experimental procedure. 
Alternatively, they may have been searching for features that would distinguish the objects 
(independent of history).  In either case, it is interesting that adults were motivated to inspect the 
objects closely when given this difficult task, as it is not clear how they would have interpreted 
such cues, even had they found them. 
 history. 
Study 2:  Absence of concealed traces of bject history 
 One possible alternative interpretation of Study 1 is that the children sel cted the owned 
object simply because the experimenter interacted with that object more than the contrasting 
object, thus capturing their attention. Study 2 was designed to test this idea. Specifically, the 
materials and procedure were nearly identical to those of Study 1, except that in this study, the 
unowned object was marked, and children were again tasked with finding their own object.  Thus, 
in order to succeed on this task, they had to find the obj ct that lacked visible traces.   
Method 
 Participants. Participants included 16 children (7 female, 9 male; age range 4.03 – 4.98; 
M age 4.54). One additional child was dropped for failing to understand the task (the child 
consistently selected both items during the test trials). Children were recruited from communities 
in and around a Midwestern university town; 81% were White.  
 Materials. The same materials from Study 1 were used. 
 Procedure. The procedure was the same as in the experimental condition of Study 1, 
except that the distracter object was marked instead of the “yours” (participant's) object. As in 
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warm-up before moving on to the test trials. Subsequently, for each test trial the experimenter 
showed the participant an object and told them “This is yours. This is for [participant’s name].” 
The object was then placed facedown in front of the experimenter. The second item was then 
introduced as “See this?” and marked in the same way as the “yours” objects in Study 1. As in 
Study 1, the experimenter also told the participant that the mark was being made (e.g., “Let’s 
mark this with a pencil”) and showed it to the participant. Finally, as in Study 1, partici nts 
were asked to find their object after both items were spun. 
Coding 
 Choice scoring. Participants’ object choices were d termined by the same method as 
Study 1; however, since the distracter object was marked in this study, the object choice was 
scored as 1 if the participant selected the unmarked, “yours”-designated object and as 0 if the 
participant selected the marked distracter object. Again, participants could obtain a maximum 
choice accuracy score of 6 and a minimum score of 0.  
 Coding for checks. Checking behavior was coded as in Study 1. 
Results 
 Choices. Children selected the owned object (i.e., the one without the mark) correctly a 
mean of 5.00 out of 6 trials, which is significantly greater than chance, t(15) = 4.70, p < .001.  
This is also significantly greater than i the no-history control condition of Study 1, t(31) = 3.78, 
p = .001, and equivalent to the experimental condition of Study 1, t(3 ) = -0.24, p = .81. 
 Checks.  Children checked the objects an average of 8.63 times, which is significantly 
greater than in the no-history control condition of Study 1, t(31) = 11.45, p < .001, and 
equivalent to the experimental condition of Study 1, t(31) = 0.33, p = .75. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 replicates the primary finding of Study 1, that preschool children seek and make 
use of hidden historical cues to identify object identity.  Moreover, because Study 2 required that 
children select the unmarked object (rather than the marked object, as in Study 1), it 
demonstrates that these results cannot simply be attributed to greater attention to or interest in the 
object that had received more attention from the researcher. 
Study 3:  Invisible traces of object history 
 An alternative explanation for the results of Studies 1 and 2 is that p rticipants were not 















TRACES OF OWNED OBJECTS 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
12 
mark in the notebook, for example, the owned noteb ok becomes materially different from the 
unowned notebook, much like a red notebook is different from a blue notebook.  Perhaps 
participants were not searching for historical traces but rather simply noting that the objects 
possess different (albeit hidden) features. Note, however, that attending to differential features in 
this task would still have required children to update their object representations based on the 
items' history, to hold that updated representation in mind even when the distinguishing features 
were no longer visible, and to consider them important when making an ownership decision. 
That preschool children search for a feature as seemingly insignificant as a dot of paint (which is 
neither salient nor functionally relevant) speaks to the centrality of historical events in their 
ownership representations. 
 Nonetheless, we wished to test whether participants search for historical traces even 
when such traces are never shown--and in fact, when the differential history leaves no visible 
trace. In Study 3, for each trial, the owned object underwent a special history in which a mark
was implied but not made.    
 In addition, we included a new control condition that asked for liking judgments, 
designed to assess whether participants are elective in their checking.  Do they check for 
historical traces only when the question requires it (ownership question: "Which is yours?"), or 
do they do so even when it is not required (liking question: "Which one do you like best?")?  The 
no-history control condition of Study 1 demonstrated that the task per se does not demand 
checking, because in the absence of differential history, child participants rarely checked the 
objects.  However, that did not address the question of the conditions under which participants 
check differential history when it is available.  Thus this additional control asked about liking 
rather than ownership, and yields two competing hypotheses.  On the one hand, participants may 
selectively make use of historical information only in response to the ownership question, given 
the special status of ownership concepts early in development (Friedman & Neary, 2008).  On 
the other hand, the special status of owned objects in economic judgments ("mere ownership 
effect", Beggan, 1992; "endowment effect", Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990) might suggest 
that participants would care about object history even when the question does not ask specifically 
about identity.  If this is the case, then we may find participants using the historical information 
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 Participants.  Participants included 32 children (4.09-5.35, M age 4.65; 11 girls, 21 boys) 
and 33 adults (18-21 years of age, M age 19; 21 women, 12 men).  Two additional children were 
tested but dropped (one was unable to complete the task, and the other was ineligible for 
inclusion due to prior participation in a similar study).  Children were recruited from 
communities in and around a Midwestern university town; 84% were White. The adult 
participants consisted of undergraduates at a large university in the same town; 79% were White. 
Within each age group, participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental or the 
like-best control condition. 
 Items.  The items were identical to the no-history control items used in Study 1. However, 
a pencil was the only tool used. Although it appeared to be a normal, functioning pencil, it had 
been altered so that it could not write. 
 Procedure.  As in the prior two studies, participants first received a warm-up trial with 
differently colored Legos. Only one child (age 4.2) had to repeat the warm-up. The procedure for 
the experimental condition was identical that of Study 1, except that the experimenter only 
pretended to mark the test objects designated as belonging to the participant, and for each test 
item the marking involved a pencil. Participants were neither shown where the impli d ark had 
been made, nor explicitly told that a mark was being made.  However, the researcher's actions 
suggested that these implied marks were in the same locations as the actual traces from Studies 1 
and 2 (e.g., on the bottom of a wooden disk; inside the mini blank book).  F r the like-best 
control condition, the procedure was identical to the experimental condition (including 
conveying ownership, pretending to mark the owned object, spinning both objects under the 
cover), except that the test question on each trial was, "Can you find which one you like best?"  
Coding 
 Choice scoring. Because the pairs of objects remained identical throughout the study 
(neither the “yours” or distracter object were marked), the method for calculating accuracy 
differed slightly from the scoring scheme used in Study 1. After the testing session was complete, 
accuracy was determined by examining the chosen objects for minute, extremely subtle 
indicators of the objects’ identity that had been placed on the key object in each pair before the 
study began.  These indicators included a tiny pencil mark between the cover and “folder” 
section of the notebook; a faint eraser mark on one edge of the disc; a pinprick on one edge of 
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box; and a pen mark on the bottom of the oval. These indicators were barely visible and never 
shown to the participants.  Even if a participant were to come across these indicators during the 
testing session, they would have been unable to distinguish which object they signified. 
 Coding for checks.  Checking behavior was coded as in Study 1. 
Results 
 In the analyses, we included as a baseline the no-history control data from Study 1, in 
which no history was provided or shown, to determine the extent to which presence versus 
absence of a history affects performance (in both cases, when there is no visible distinction 
between the objects in a pair).   
 Choices. Participant scores were entered into a 2-way ANOVA with age group (child, 
adult) and condition (experimental, like-best control, no-history control) as between-subjects 
factors (Table 2).  There was a significant effect for age group, F(1,92) = 7.70, p = .025, ηp
 Checks. Checks were entered into a 2-way ANOVA with age group (child, adult) and 
condition (experimental, ike-best control, no-history control) as between-subjects factors (see 
Table 3).  We obtained a main effect of condition, F(2,92) = 8.58, p < .001, η
² 
= .054, indicating that adults performed better than children (Ms = 3.71, 3.15), with adults' scores 
slightly but significantly above chance, t(48) = 4.07, p < .001, but children's scores at chance, 
t(48) = 0.85, p = .40.  There were no differences as a function of condition, indicating that 
participants had difficulty identifying the owned object in the absence of an identifying mark. 
p² = .16, a main 
effect of age group, F(1,92) = 59.21, p < .001, ηp² = .39, and a trend toward a condition x age 
group interaction, F(2,92) = 2.86, p = .062, ηp
Discussion 
² = .059.  Collapsing over age group, we found that 
participants were more likely to search for traces in both the experimental a d the like-best 
control conditions than in the no-history control condition from Study 1 (Ms = 8.75, 7.31, 5.15), 
both ps < .05, and that the invisible and like-best control conditions did not significantly differ, p 
= .32.  However, this effect was carried wholly by the children (Ms = 6.56, 5.19, 1.18), as adults 
showed no significant differences across conditions (Ms = 10.94, 9.44, 9.12, ps > .40). 
 Study 3 again demonstrates that children, like adults, seek traces of object history.  This 
evidence is stronger than that of Studies 1 and 2, in three respects.  First, both children and adults 
searched for historical traces that were not just hidden but invisible -- that is, no marks were 
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Second, in contrast to Studies 1 and 2, the experimenter never verbally highlighted or narrated 
the historical event that differentiated the two objects in each set.  Third, both children and adults 
searched for historical traces on a task in which identifying the owned object was not strictly 
necessary.  That is, both children and adults searched for cues to object history on the like-best 
control task, when they were not asked about object identity ("Can you find which one is 
yours?"), but rather when asked about object liking ("Can you find which one you like best?").  
This result is consistent with a "mere ownership" effect, whereby merely owning an object leads 
one to like it more (Beggan, 1992).  In order to test this idea directly, however, it would be 
necessary to compare an ownership condition with a non-ownership condition.  If children were 
provided no ownership information but still searched for the marking when asked to find the one 
they like better, this would suggest that rather than stemming from the mere ownership effect, 
children might look for the marking whenever asked to distinguish between two otherwise 
identical-looking objects. However, this test is outside of the scope of the present report. 
 Although adults selected the owned objects much less often in Study 3 (62%) than in the 
Experimental condition of Study 1 when distinguishing features were concealed rather than 
invisible (100%), a surprising result was that they were non-random in their choices.  We do not 
know how adults achieved above-chance performance, given that the historical features were 
non-visible.  However, it may be that they occasionally detected minute variations in the items 
that were unrelated to object history (e.g., slight dents or imperfections), thus occasionally 
permitting them to successfully guess which item in each pair had been assigned as their own.   
 The finding that both preschool children and adults searched for history cues even on the 
"like-best" task also raises the question of whether participants will always use object history on 
any task in which it has been provided (or implied), or whether instead they show appropriate 
selectivity, refraining from using object history when other cues are sufficient.  Study 4 is 
designed to test this question. 
Study 4:  Invisible traces in visibly distinct objects 
 Study 4 was identical to Study 3, with one exception: namely, the two objects on each 
trial were overtly and visibly distinct from one another (different colors or patterns).   We 
predicted that when observable features distinguish the object choices, neither childr n nor adults 
would look for traces of their history.  This finding, if obtained, would rule out a response bias 
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rationality principle, in which they pursue goals efficiently (Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koós, & 
Brockbank, 1999; Rose & Baillargeon, 2013).  
 Because the objects in each set were visibly distinct, it was important to rule out the 
possibility that the object assigned to the participant was more desirable (and thus was selected 
as the owned object on that basis).  We therefore again included liking judgments as a control. 
Method 
 Participants.  Participants included 32 children (age range 4.00-5.37 years, M age 4.63; 
14 girls, 18 boys) and 32 adults (18-23 years of age, M age 20; 25 women, 7 men).  Four 
additional children were tested but dropped (one did not complete the task, one was ineligible for 
inclusion because of participation in a similar study previously, for one we did not have the 
child's birth-date, and for one there was equipment malfunction).  Children were recruited from 
communities in and around a Midwestern university town; 78% were White. The adult 
participants consisted of undergraduates at a large university in the same town; 56% were White. 
Within each age group, participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental or the 
like-best control condition. 
 Items.  The items were identical to the items used in Study 3, except that the two items in 
each pair could be readily distinguished by their outward appearance, either d fferent colors 
and/or different patterns (e.g., one wooden star was yellow, the other was orange; one mini-
notebook had a yellow flower on the cover, the other had a purple flower on the cover). 
 Procedure.  The procedures used in the experimental and like-best control conditions of 
Study 4 were identical to those used in Study 3.   
Coding 
 Choice scoring. Choice accuracy was determined as in Study 3. 
 Coding for checks.  Checking behavior was coded as in Study 1. 
Results 
 In addition to the key comparison between the experimental condition and the like-b st 
control condition, we again included the Study 1 no-history control condition as a "low" baseline 
of how often children selected the owned object and engaged in checking behaviors when there 
was no differential history and no outwardly differentiating features between the two objects in 
each pair.  
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and condition (experimental, like-best control, no-history control) as between-subjects factors 
(see Table 2).  We obtained a main effect of condition, F(2,92) = 49.68, p < .001, ηp² = .52, 
indicating that the experimental condition yielded more accurate selections of the owned object 
than either the like-best or no-history control conditions (Ms = 5.87, 3.28, 3.39), ps < .001.  The 
two latter conditions did not differ from one another.  T-tests against chance (3.0) indicated that 
participants selected the owned object significantly above chance in the experimental condition, 
t(31) = 2.87, p < .001, but not in the like-best control condition, t(32) = 1.05, p = .30.  We also 
obtained a main effect for age group, F(1,92) = 5.71, p = .019, ηp
 Checks. Checking scores were entered into a 2-way ANOVA with age group (child, 
adult) and condition (experimental, like-best control, no-history control) as between-subjects 
factors (see Table 3). We obtained a main effect of condition, F(2,91) = 29.86, p < .001, η
² = .06, indicating more 
accurate selections by adults than children (Ms = 4.45, 3.88). 
p² 
= .40, a main effect of age group, F(1,91) = 10.84, p = .001, ηp² = .11, and a condition x age 
group interaction, F(2,91) = 61.13, p < .001, ηp
Discussion 
² = .57. Adults searched for traces significantly 
more often in the no-history condition from Experiment 1 than either of the two conditions in 
which the objects were visibly distinct (Ms = 9.12, 0.44, 1.06), ps < .001, and the latter two 
conditions did not differ significantly from one another, p = 1.00.  In contrast, children searched 
for traces of history significantly more in the experimental condition than the no-history c ntrol 
condition, p = .027, with the like-best control condition in the middle and not significantly 
different from either of the other two conditions (Ms = 3.12, 1.18, 2.12, ps > .50). 
 Study 4 demonstrates that children, like adults, are selective in their use of historical cues 
tied to ownership.  When these cues are redundant due to visible differences between items, both 
age groups wer  much less likely to search for hidden traces of an object's historical path.  
However, children were more likely to search for cues in this redundant condition than were 
adults, suggesting that children were not as skilled as adults in efficiently directing their actions 
only when needed. 
 Another benefit of this study is that it provides an additional control for Study 3. Study 4 
was procedurally identical to Study 3, and thus presented identical task demands, inclu ing the 
extent to which attention was drawn to one of the objects and the intentionality of the 
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the objects for historical traces, thereby demonstrating further that task demands are insufficient 
to result in the searching behaviors we recorded in the previous studies. 
Study 5:  Three-year-olds' search for traces of object history 
 Given the success of four-year-olds on this task, it is of particular interest to examine the 
performance of younger children. As noted in the Introduction, prior work has found 
developmental changes between 3 and 5 years of age in children's appearance/reality contrasts 
(Deák et al., 2003; Flavell et al., 1983), use of subtle features indicating function (Kelemen et al., 
2003), and use of conceptual vs. more obvious features on certain categorization and induction 
tasks (Badger & Shapiro, 2012; Fisher, 2011).  Moreover, Nancekivell and Friedman (2014) 
found that 3-year-olds did not infer differential histories to explain why a character owns certain 
objects, in contrast to 4- and 5-year-olds.  These prior results suggest that the tendency to attend 
to object history and connect it to present features may undergo important developmental 
changes in the preschool years, and that when presented with our task, 3-year-olds may be 
unable to link ownership to object history. On the other hand, if ownership is a developmental 
primitive (Jackendoff, 1992), and if the capacity to link visible features to historical processes is 
an immediate cognitive process (Leyton, 1992), then even 3-year-olds may link ownership to 
object history.  
 We included three key conditions from the earlier studies:  the concealed trace condition 
(from Study 1), the invisible trace condition (from Study 3), and the no-hist ry control condition 
(from Study 1).  
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 55 three-year-olds, assigned to one of three conditions:  
concealed trace (n=22, M age 3.36, range 3.07 to 3.86; 11 girls, 11 boys), invisible trace (n=17, 
M age 3.50, range 3.08 to 3.97; 10 girls, 7 boys), and no-history control (n=16, M age 3.29, range 
3.02 to 3.57; 10 girls, 6 boys). Five additional children were tested but dropped for repeatedly 
failing the warm-up or not completing the task.  Children were recruited from communities in 
and around a Midwestern university town, and were primarily White.  
 Items.  The items in the concealed trace and no-history control conditions were identical 
to those from Study 1; items in the invisible trace condition were identical to those from Study 3.  
 Procedure.  The procedure was identical to those of the rel vant conditions in Studies 1 
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Coding 
 Coding of choices and checking behavior were identical to those of Study 1. 
Results 
 Choices. Participant scores were entered into a univariate ANOVA with condition 
(concealed trace, invisible trace, no-history control) as a between-subjects factor (see Table 4).  
Three-year-olds identified the owned object more accurately in the concealed trace condition (M 
= 4.13) than in the invisible trace and no-history control conditions (Ms = 3.18, 3.04), F(2,52) = 
4.04, p = .023, ηp
Insert Table 4 about here 
² = .13.  Performance was ignificantly above chance (of 3.0) in the concealed 
trace condition, t(21) = 3.49, p = .002, but at chance in the invisible trace and no-history control 
conditions, ps > .59.   
 Checks. Checks were entered into a univariate ANOVA with condition (concealed trace, 
invisible trace, no-history control) as betwen-subjects factors (see Table 4).  Three-year-olds 
were more likely to search for traces in both the concealed and invisible trace onditions (Ms = 
5.90, 4.82) than in the no-history control condition (M = 1.82), F(2,52) = 8.47, p = .001, ηp
 Correlations.  In order to determine the effects of age on performance across the full 
child age range (i.e., from 3-5 years), we combined the child data from Studies 1 and 3 with 
those of Study 5, and conducted a series of six bivariate Pearson correlations:  three for the 
choices in each of the concealed trace, invisible trace, and no-history control conditions, and 
three for the checks in each of the same three conditions.  The data appear in Table 5. As can be 
seen, age significantly predicted choices in the concealed trace condition, indicating that older 
children more readily made use of subtle historical cues to identify the object assigned to them.  
Not surprisingly, age did not predict hoices in either the invisible trace or the no-history control 
conditions, given that the lack of distinguishing features meant that participants of all ages were 
forced to guess.  In contrast, for participants' checking behavior, age significantly predicted 
performance in both the concealed trace and invisible trace conditions, demonstrating that older 
children were more apt to search for cues to object history than younger children, regardless of 
whether those cues were detectable.  In contrast, age did not predict checking behavior in the no-
history control condition. 
² 
= .25.  Post-hoc tests revealed no significant difference between the concealed and invisible trace 
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Insert Table 5 about here 
 We also conducted a correlation between checking and choices, within each of these 
conditions.  As shown in Table 5, in the concealed trace condition, those children who engaged 
in more checking behavior more successfully identified their owned objects, indicating that 
preschool children can coordinate searching behavior with identifying and interpreting historical 
traces.  In contrast, no significant correlations were obtained in the invisible trace or no-history 
control conditions, where checking behavior could not result in successful object choices, given 
the lack of visible cues. 
Discussion 
 Study 5 extends the prior studies to three-year-old children who were over a full year 
younger than the four- and five-year-olds in Studies 1-4.  These data show remarkably similar 
patterns to the previous studies, with children seeking concealed and invisible traces of objects in 
the context of an ownership task. Importantly, when cues were hidden but visible, children 
successfully used this information to identify which of two identical items in each pair was their 
own.  A baseline control condition verified that this behavior did not emerge when the objects 
did not differ in history.   
 Although participants throughout the age range of 3 to 5 years linked history to objects 
and used hidden traces to identify their property, children's tendencies to do so increased over 
time.  These developmental patterns suggest that children are consolidating these skills during 
the preschool period.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Altogether, this set of five studies demonstrates that children as young as three years of 
age actively search for traces of object history when making ownership judgments. These traces 
were perceptually subtle ( ither hidden or altogether invisible), functionally insignificant, and 
not directly queried (e.g., the experimenter did not ask, "Which did I mark?"). Nonetheless, 
children actively attended to the differential histories of the items and spontaneously determined 
that they were relevant to ownership. Although prior research demonstrated that children make 
use of spatiotemporal cues to history in their ownership decisions (e.g., current possession, 
spatiotemporal continuity), the present studies are the first to find that preschool children (a) 
expect history to leave a visible trace on objects, and (b) seek such traces to determine ownership.  
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object concepts, one that is often overlooked in theoretical debates in the literature, and that 
opens up a variety of important questions for the future. Whereas spatiotemporal history is often 
conceptualized and operationalized as being in competition with fea ural cues, as if the two are in 
opposition, these studies demonstrate that linking features cues to an object'shistory is an 
important aspect of human cognition.   
 Because the task in these studies entails searching for material differences between 
objects, it rests on a causal analysis of what sorts of properties can be transmitted as a result of 
the historical event (Leyton, 1992; White, 2009). Whereas some historical events are likely to 
leave traces (e.g., a plastic spoon falling onto muddy ground), others are less likely to do so (e.g., 
a plastic spoon falling onto a clean carpet). Although one can minimize the cues that result from 
object history and make them more subtle and non-obvious, ultimately one cannot remove the 
possibility of them altogether while still maintaining the logic of this task,  participants should 
not search for cues to object history if they believe them to be invisible. Therefore, when 
children succeeded on the task, we cannot determine whether they were actively thinking about 
object history, as they may instead have been consulting their updated representations of the 
objects.  However, we do know that this updating process required incorporating historical 
events into their object representations. In this sense, there is an important distinction between 
item sets for which consideration of the historical information is superfluous (e.g., when 
indications of history are continuously visible and obvious, as in the differently-colored Lego 
blocks in the warm-up task) versus item sets for which updating a mental representation requires
 Controls were included that allow us to rule out various alternative interpretations of 
these results.  First, children rarely checked the objects when historical evidence was not implied, 
demonstrating that their inspection of objects wa  not the result of task demands (Study 1 
control).  Second, children successfully used the absence of object history to identify owned 
objects that lacked historical traces, demonstrating that they did not simply allocate more 
attention to objects handled by the researcher (Study 2). Third, children were significantly less 
likely to check objects in the presence of redundant, visual cues that differentiated the items in a 
pair, indicating that they di  not indiscriminately search for historical evidence (Study 4).  This 
result also demonstrates that the results of Studies 1 and 3 are not solely due to procedural 
factors, such as the experimenter's d awing attention to one object, or the intentionality of her 
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actions.  
 These controls demonstrate some of the important boundary conditions under which 
children do and do not consult cues to object history, but more questions remain.  For example, 
the intentionality of the researcher's actions may have encouraged a causal analysis of the events 
(see Butler & Markman, 2014), and it would be interesting in future research to determine if 
children would still attend to historical features when the researcher's actions are instead 
accidental. We also do not wish to claim that history is unique in directing children's attention to 
non-obvious cues.  Preschool children seek non-obvious, albeit non-hist rical cues in their 
exploratory play (Schulz, Standing, & Bonawitz, 2008) and when reasoning about causes (see 
also Butler & Markman, 2014; Sobel et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2014) and object functions 
(Kelemen et al., 2003).  
 Although in many respects children's responses were comparable to those of adults, there 
were some differences as well.  First, whereas children searched the objects only when a 
differential history was implied, adults did so even in the absence of such a distinction (Study 1 
control).  Adults may hold a broad expectation that objects inevitably carry traces of their history, 
such that they look for such cues even when the experimental procedure provides no evidence 
that the two objects in each set had different histories.  In contrast, young children may require 
evidence of an overt historical cue with known causal effects, in order to make these links. 
Second, in Study 3, when the historical traces were invisible, adults more persistently searched 
for these cues than did children, suggesting that children may find it more difficult to persist in 
their search when they do not have a concrete memory of what the his orical trace looks like. 
Third, in Study 4, when redundant visible cues were present, children were much more likely 
than adults to continue to check the objects for traces of their history.  This finding suggest  that 
children may not be as efficient asdults in using available cues to guide and limit their search.  
Fourth, the correlations with age in Study 5 indicated developmental changes over the period of 
3 to 5 years of age, with increased searching for historical traces as well as increased success in 
identifying the owned object.   
 An important question that remains unresolved from this series of studies is the 
conceptual role of ownership per se, and the extent to which it encourages participants to attend 
to historical cues.  In all the conditions, the two objects contrasted in the ownership information 
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mentioned).  Prior research indicates that ownership may especially draw attention to object 
history (e.g., children are more likely to track which of several similar or identical objects is 
which, after hearing ownership information than after hearing a common-noun label; Gelman et 
al., 2014).  Would children focus on object history whenever they are asked to make a choice 
among objects (e.g., when provided with a category label rather than ownership information), or 
does ownership especially draw children's attention to this dimension? We speculate that 
children may be particularly attentive to history when it involves objects that they themselves 
own (Cunningham, Vergunst, Macrae, & Turk, 2013), when it involves agents for whom they 
have a strong emotional response (either positive or negative; e.g., Gelman et al., 2015), or when 
it involves causal processes that are believed to have powerful effects, such as contaminants (e.g., 
Legare et al., 2009).  These open questions would be interesting to examine in future studies. 
 Ownership information in the current studies was presented xplicitly ("This is yours; 
this is for [child's name]"; "Which one is yours?"), and prior work on ownership using imilar 
procedures found effects indicating a special relation between owner and object (Cunningham et 
al., 2013; Coventry, Griffiths, & Hamilton, 2014; Gelman et al., 2012; Gelman et al., 2014). 
Nonetheless, because ownership information was only verbally stated, participants may have 
viewed this relation as temporary, and future research could examine whether childr n would 
respond differently if ownership information were either enhanced (e.g., by letting the child take 
the object home for a period of time, before testing) or diminished (e.g., if ownership were 
assigned to an unknown third party rather than to the participant himself or hrself).  
Conclusions and implications 
 The present findings have implications for the perennial question in developmental 
psychology concerning when and to what extent children's concepts are based on salient surface 
appearances versus theory-based considerations. It is well-known that children are easily seduced 
by outward perceptual features on many categorization, word-learning, and inference tasks, and 
that their tendency to do so decreases over time (Piaget, 1970; Rakison & Oakes, 2003; Sloutsky, 
Kloos, & Fisher, 2007). Nonetheless, the present studies d monstrate an important way in which 
children’s object concepts include theory-like considerations:  Children privilege features based 
on a causal analysis of how history results in perceptible traces.  These findings are notable given 
that the traces were subtle (either non-obvious or invisible), that children maintained this ability 
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children could instead have privileged features such as shape, function, or spatiotemporal 
continuity). The findings are consistent with an extensive and growing body of evidence 
(reviewed earlier) that children consider non-obvious features of objects when reaso ing about 
their function, causal consequences, and identity.  
 It would be misleading, however, to place too stark a contrast between appearance and 
object history.  Although in certain contexts and on certain tasks these factors can be pitted 
against one another, there are important and lawful relations between the two. The key 
conclusion from this series of studies is not that children consider history instead of perceptible 
features (although in some contexts they can do so), but rather that children consider causal links 
between history and perceptible features.  This work supports the broader conclusion that the 
process of linking perceptual and conceptual features occurs early in childhood for a range of 
conceptual tasks (not only in thinking about ownership, but also in thinking about functions and 
causes). 
 An important empirical direction for the future is to chart the development of children's 
capacity to build these links between historical processes and perceptual transformations.  For 
example, when does attention to historical traces emerge in development?  Furthermore, when 
and how do children make the reverse inference (inferring historical events from perceptible 
features)?  Certainly adults can infer historical processes from featural differences (e.g., a dented 
car invites inferences regarding the history that yielded those features--a process that Leyton, 
1992, calls a "history-recovery" process).  Preschool children are able to form at least 
rudimentary inferences of this sort as well (Gelman et al., 1980; Rosengren et al., 1991).  
However, little is known regarding the scope of such inferences in childhood, and whether (and 
if so, when) they emerge unprompted.  
 More generally, the process of attempting to link perceptual and conceptual may be an 
important engine of cognitive development (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). An appeal to underlyig, 
internal, or historical causal properties engages children in the important interplay between data 
and theory that leads to conceptual change. This approach aligns with that of Waxman and 
Gelman (2009, p. 263), who propose that at all ages children rely on both perceptual and 
conceptual information, that is, both statistical regularities in the environment and theory:  "As 
infants and young children build a repertoire of concepts and acquire words to describe them, 
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rudimentary theories that they hold and the statistics that they witness."  
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Table 1.  Test materials in Studies 1-5. 
 
Test objects  Concealed trace  Invisible trace Location 
    (Studies 1, 2, & 5)  (Studies 3, 4, & 5) of trace 
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Play-Doh containers Thumb print   Pencil mark  Inside 
Boxes w/ figurines Changed position  Pencil mark  Inside 
Wooden disks  Spot of paint   Pencil mark  Under 
Wooden stars  Sticky note   Pencil mark  Under 
Cardboard boxes Paper stuck to bottom  Pencil mark  Under   
 
Table 2. Studies 1-4, mean number of choices of owned object, as a function of study, condition, 
and age group (SDs in parentheses).  Scores can range from 0-6. 
 
      4-YEAR-OLDS  ADULTS 
STUDY 1 (Concealed traces) 
 Experimental    5.09 (1.77)    6.00 (0.00) 
 No-history control   2.94 (1.39)    3.74 (1.43) 
STUDY 2 (Absence of traces) 
 Experimental    4.95 (1.66)   -- 
STUDY 3 (Invisible traces) 
 Experimental    3.19 (1.22)    3.82 (1.18) 
 Like-best control   3.31 (0.87)    3.56 (1.09) 
STUDY 4 (Visibly distinct objects; invisible traces) 
 Experimental    5.75 (0.45)    6.00 (0.00) 
 Like-best control   2.94 (1.43)    3.62 (1.50) 
 
 
Table 3. Studies 1-4, mean number of checks, as a function of study, condition, and age group 
(SDs in parentheses). 
 
      4-YEAR-OLDS  ADULTS 
STUDY 1 (Concealed traces) 
 Experimental    8.39 (1.92)    9.13 (1.75) 
 No-history control   1.18 (1.42)    9.13 (3.56) 
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 Experimental    8.63 (2.25)   -- 
STUDY 3 (Invisible traces) 
 Experimental    6.56 (2.34)    10.94 (5.18) 
 Like-best control   5.19 (3.37)      9.44 (4.15) 
STUDY 4 (Visibly distinct objects; invisible traces) 
 Experimental    3.12 (1.59)    0.44 (0.89) 
 Like-best control   2.12 (1.96)    1.06 (2.14) 
 
Table 4. Study 5, three-year-olds' mean number of choices and checks, as a function of condition 
(SDs in parentheses). 
 
     
 
CHOICES   CHECKS 
Concealed traces   4.13 (1.52)   5.90 (3.13) 
Invisible traces   3.18 (1.33)   4.82 (3.94) 
No-history control   3.04 (0.91)   1.82 (1.46) 
 
Table 5.  Correlational analyses involving children across Studies 1, 3, and 5. Note:  * p < .05, ** 
p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
    Concealed Traces Invisible Traces No-History Control 
    (N = 39)  (N = 33)  (N = 33) 
  
Choices with Age  .32*    .07     .07 
Checks with Age  .46**   .35*   -.19 
Choices with Checks  .61***   .03   -.07 
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